KEY COMPONENTS OF THE POLISH POSITION
IN REGARD TO THE EASTERN POLICY
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

In order to shape the European Union’s policy towards the ‘East’, Poland had to move from the ‘East’ to the ‘West’, which was a process enabled by the country’s membership in the EU and NATO. In the European policy tradition, the ‘East’ is not merely a geographical notion. Beyond its geographical context, the term has various meanings. The Polish understanding of this term often assumes the widely-understood heritage of communism, totalitarian rule and subjugation to the Kremlin. Overall, the better political condition and the more favourable geopolitical location of a state is, the lower the degree to which Europe perceives it as the ‘East’. However, striving to participate, or the very participation, in the integration process does not necessarily ‘move’ any society or state to the West; it only means that the community is seeking change. One of the consequences of the Cold War was a common perception that was characteristic for the institutions of the European community and Western governments before 1989 of the Soviet Union and the Central European states grouped together by the Warsaw Pact as the political ‘East’. The key to policy towards the East was found in relations with Russia and it was through Russia that relations with particular Soviet republics and satellite states were perceived. Relations with the East were conducted via Moscow. Poland entered into diplomatic relations with the European Economic

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1 This article was Publisher in Polish language dunder title Kluczowe elementy stanowiska Polski wobec polityki wschodniej Unii Europejskiej in ‘Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna, 2015 no. 32, p. 159–183. This article partly elaborates on selected threads from another one written by myself titled Sztuka przekonywania. Polska a polityka wschodnia Unii Europejskiej w latach 2004–2014. [The art of persuasion. Poland vs. EU eastern policy 2004–2014.] Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, 2014 no. 32.
Community (EEC) in the autumn of 1988. Even before the Round Table talks ended, official negotiations had been held on 21 and 22 March 1989 in Brussels in regard to an agreement between the People’s Republic of Poland and the EEC. In the negotiation process Poland was represented by Andrzej Olechowski². Also importantly, one of the first guests of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the newly elected non-communist Prime Minister of Poland, was Jaques Delors who came to Poland on 9 September 1989. Clearly, diplomatic gestures could not automatically change a country’s status from ‘East’ to ‘West’, yet they would initiate the process.

It is also important to state that after 1989, the EEC (the European Union) continued for some time to regard Central European states as the ‘East’; first as a part of the dissolving sphere of Soviet influence and then, after the 1989–1991 transformation, as Eastern neighbours already in the process of rapid integration. The main change meant that relations with the Central European states striving to join the EU were no longer so much dependent on political contact with Russia. However, the determination of Western governments to recognise in everyday practice, rather than declarations, the cutting of the umbilical cord of the Cold War with the USSR was a gradual process; just as much as the Kremlin stepping away from influencing decisions of countries that not so long ago were subordinate to Russia. It commenced with Mikhail Gorbachev gradually diverting from the Brezhnev Doctrine after 1985.

Russia’s approach towards the former members of the COMECON and the Warsaw Pact differed, however, from its behaviour towards the former Soviet republics. In regard to the states that emerged from the collapse of the USSR, a change in the approach towards the neighbours was even less obvious. In this case Russia made sure that any integration processes that those states would undertake with Western structures would take place with the Kremlin’s approval, if at all. Over time Moscow’s approach was to have Russia, in the case of the association agreements concluded between the states of the former USSR and the EU (except for Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia which were part of the USSR for the shortest period of time), be regarded as a third party. Obviously from the formal point of view, this was not acceptable for the West. In 2004, the European Union expanded through the accession of ten new states: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Hungary. Consequently, the existing

‘East’ became overnight, in the legal sense, a part of the European Union, which meant embarking on a challenging task to determine what the EU in its new shape would from now consider the ‘East’.

The year 2004 was the key moment for shaping EU Eastern policy also for reasons other than the expansion itself. It was also the year of the people’s revolutions that swept through Georgia and Ukraine; in October 2004 the Constitutional Treaty was signed in Rome. It was the treaty which finally ruled on the need for a common EU foreign policy, clearly primarily in regard to the EU’s Eastern neighbours. Since that time, the notion of ‘East’ and its place on Europe’s map was finally changed within the EU. For the states that fled the East it meant that the initial condition was fulfilled and they could now shape the EU’s Eastern policy.

It remained undefined, however, what the EU’s Eastern policy meant in this new reality. Clearly, it was understood differently by major EU member states. After all, among EU member states there is no universal canon of perception of Eastern policy; neither is there one doctrine in this respect. In one sense, the mistake in the Polish approach towards the EU’s Eastern policy lies in the unspoken belief that Poland has the tradition and doctrine of its own Eastern policy, whereas other states either do not have it or their approach is based on incomplete knowledge. Ignoring other traditions of Eastern policy on the continent has been one of the main barriers to the effectiveness of Poland aiming at establishing rules for conducting Eastern policy for the European Union as a whole.

However, once we understand that Eastern policy is not solely the domain of one EU member state and there are numerous traditions, we may assume, for simplicity reasons, that on the European continent we are dealing with two fundamentally different approaches: the Russia-centric approach which is generally based on the conviction that Russia is the main host of the non-EU East and the other approach determined by the belief that the states

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on the Eastern border with the expanded EU are, similarly to the former Central European member states of the Warsaw Pact, likely to be ‘wedded to a recipe for success’ in terms of modernisation and joining the EU in the future. Sławomir Dębski names this second approach, which is characteristic not only for Polish but also Lithuanian policy, as optimistic determinism. This approach assumes a certainty of an optimistic scenario being implemented in the East\(^5\), the belief that the processes taking place there will end with extensive modernisation and harmonisation with the EU. Its biggest weakness is resisting the temptation to put together alternative scenarios for political development.

This optimistic determinism in the approach towards Ukraine or Georgia was the element which urged Poland to demand revision of the existing EU policy in the East. It emerged from the Promethean belief, rooted in the dominant doctrine of Eastern policy in Poland developed by Jerzy Giedroyc, which stated that the area between the Eastern border of Poland and Russia is a historic area of competition with Russia for the nature of the states in that region, their political system, as well as subjection or not to Russian imperialism, etc. The program of such perception of the East in the Polish tradition has not changed significantly since the times of the watershed article authored by Juliusz Mieroszewski and titled ‘Russian “Polish complex” and the area of ULB\(^6\).

**Poland in the Debate on the EU’s Eastern Policy**

The primary aspirations of Poland with regard to shaping the EU’s Eastern policy following its decision to take the EU accession path are the following: first of all, not to be the ‘East’ alone; secondly, to give rise to a situation in which the EU carries out a harmonised policy towards the new ‘East’, and


to have a decisive influence on this policy and shape it in accordance with Polish convictions.

From 1998 to 2003 research activities were undertaken in Poland focusing on the initiative of the EU’s Eastern policy. This was probably the first time when Poland critically participated in preparing a political concept to be implemented not solely by Poland but by the EU with Poland’s participation. Therefore, undertaking activities in the area of the EU’s Eastern policy already before the EU’s expansion might be seen as a sign of Polish readiness for EU accession. A significant novelty was also the broad participation of non-governmental groups in these activities. Initially, they were conducted in two ways: as conceptual actions of NGOs and think-tanks as well as an element of the political program of particular parties, and as the official policy of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With regard to the former, key actions were undertaken by three Warsaw-based organisations, namely: the Centre for International Relations, the Centre for Eastern Studies, and the Batory Foundation. The results of their research, seminars, etc. included, among others, two studies: Eastern Policy of the EU: the Visegrad Countries’ Perspective. Thinking about an Eastern Dimension published by the Centre for Eastern Studies and The EU’s ‘Eastern Dimension’ – An Opportunity for or Idée Fixe of Poland’s Policy? prepared by several authors for the Centre of International Relations as well as a large conference at the Stefan Batory Foundation in Warsaw. The common denominator of the two documents, as Agnieszka Legucka rightly states, was the hesitancy regarding formulated proposals, a lack of precision, etc., or perhaps inadequate knowledge concerning our expectations in drawing up the range of the future Eastern policy, both in the territorial sense and in terms of the expected range of EU activity. This can be observed in excessive reference to the Northern dimension of the EU which was not the most effective EU initiative.

At the beginning of 2003 the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared an official document outlining Polish expectations regarding the future of the EU’s policy in the East. This text can be regarded as a brief summary of the discussion which had been taking place in Poland for quite some time already. One could even say that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs simply adopted the proposals from the debates carried out by the NGO circles, which they later decided to promote in the EU. It is worth stressing that at that time

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Poland was not yet a member of the European Union. However, the proposal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the first commitment of substance in the official Polish position in terms of the future EU Eastern policy. The initiative was made up of four new EU Eastern neighbours (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, and Russia) but focused on the states determined to carry out reforms, primarily Ukraine and Moldova. Some countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia were side-lined but were still taken into account. The document mentioned the role of the EU in resolving problems of particular states dependent upon their determination to carry out reforms. However, as a way to justify the Eastern Neighbours, their historical heritage of communism was emphasised, as well as its political consequences. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs expected the EU to treat every one of these states individually, to expand financial assistance, encourage youth exchanges, establish a European Endowment for Democracy for the promotion of human rights and successful transformation models, support infrastructural development and cross-border cooperation, etc.8 The program of the ministry was discussed at the above-mentioned conference in Warsaw on 20 and 21 February 2003. It was organised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Batory Foundation. It is indicative that it was not only Polish officials and experts who participated in the debate, but also top Polish politicians, including: Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Bronisław Geremek, and Bronisław Komorowski, as well as numerous foreign guests, including Dumitru Braghis, the former Prime Minister of Moldova, Borys Tarasiuk, the then president of the Committee for European Integration of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, or the deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland – Antti Satuli9. When opening the conference, Aleksander Smolar announced a new phase in Poland’s accession to the EU: ‘Even though Poland is not yet a member of the EU, we are entering a phase when we are taking up the responsibilities of a full EU member state, including the co-responsibility for foreign policy’10. In this way the organiser justified Poland’s participation in the debate, formally speaking

from the position of a country aspiring for membership. While opening the conference, President Aleksander Kwaśniewski announced that: ‘the enlarged EU will significantly move towards the East. For the first time it will so clearly cover with its Eastern end the line where the Latin civilisation would, for centuries, encounter the Byzantine civilisation. It shall also cross the border of the former Soviet Union’.

This significant meeting in early 2003 shows the level of attention that the elite bringing Poland to the EU paid to a joint undertaking of the EU’s Eastern policy. Several other issues characterising the period preceding Poland’s accession to the EU were also demonstrated during the conference. The political elite were aware of the geopolitical consequences of enlargement and the change in understanding the concept of the ‘East’ in Europe. They also understood that enlargement would most likely result in another one as the perspective of membership for the Eastern Neighbours would be present in speeches serving the role of some sort of an ‘insurance’ of their reform processes. Thus, in the speeches and a publication prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs we can find the conviction that the Polish experience of system transformation might be a necessary tool for the Eastern Neighbours. Clearly it was already at the turn of 2002 and 2003 that the optimistic (the question remains whether realised by the elite or not) determinism, described by the above-quoted Sławomir Dębski, was prevailing among the Polish elite as much as was the belief that the Eastern neighbours, similarly to Poland and other Central European states, would sooner or later end up in the EU. Undoubtedly, the debate that had taken place in Poland in the years preceding the country’s accession to the EU set a difficult and controversial task for a long-term goal of EU policy, namely EU membership for the other states. Taking into account the views dominant in the West, it also outlined dispute areas with other member states.

‘WIDER EUROPE’ AND NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

In 2002 the United Kingdom and Sweden put forward a proposal for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova to be included in a project called the ‘New Neighbourhood’. In discussions over the proposals put forward by these two Northern countries, a certain phenomenon could have been observed which

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would later dominate the debates on relations of the EU with its Neighbours, especially a kind of geopolitical blackmail of the Southern member states, fearing, rightly or not, that EU Eastern policy will weaken the Southern dimension of EU’s external policy. Interestingly, in 2002 it was the very same member states that opened the debate on the future policy towards the Eastern Neighbours while sending a special correspondence to the Spanish Presidency. The British proposal was more precise: it referred to Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, whereas the Swedes presented a wide vision of Europe from ‘Russia to Morocco’. Jack Straw, with characteristic British pragmatism, demanded the establishment of a status of ‘special neighbours’ in the East and supported their reforms which, after the planned enlargement in Central Europe would prevent the influx of illegal migrants and criminal activity from the new Eastern neighbours. It is crucial to keep in mind that in the correspondences of the British and Swedish Ministries of Foreign Affairs, between January and March 2002, it can be read that Poland was no longer considered to be a part of the ‘East’ since enlargement of the EU had already been determined. This, however, did not mean that Poland, or any other Central European state, would be treated as partners in developing new EU policy in the East.

Within the EU institutions, activities on establishing the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) were already taking place in 2003 when it became clear that the enlargement would take place on May 1st 2004. The key communication of the European Commission (ENP strategic document) was dated May 12th 2003. Linking together these two facts, the current enlargement with a potential necessity of further EU enlargement or proposing an alternative solution, was already the objective of the European Council declaration prepared for the establishment of the ENP dating back to March 2003, addressed to the Commission and the Parliament with the meaningful title: *Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*. From that moment onward the EU

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approach towards the new ‘East’ was determined by an official position of the EU institutions rather than the views of particular member states.

Importantly, ‘wider Europe’ avoided promising membership. Instead it promised all the neighbours from the South and East to be gradually included, at an advanced stage of reforms, into the Single Market of the European Union\textsuperscript{15}. Generally speaking, the document presented by the European Commission failed to close the debate on the EU’s Eastern policy. It also lacked maturity in forming political proposals for the Eastern Neighbours. The shape of the European Neighbourhood Policy, even though the East was put on the first place, responded primarily to the balance of power in the EU where the Southern states such as Italy, Spain, or France were more powerful than the new Central European member states. It could not have been any other way. This is why the Southern countries outside Europe, but close enough to be its neighbours, found their place within the Neighbourhood Policy more easily. These states have used up to 70 per cent of the policy funds. Naturally, the ENP also included the states which are EU neighbours in Europe. This is the key issue since those states, at least theoretically in accordance with provisions of the treaty, might apply for membership in the EU. Therefore, the Neighbourhood Policy was supposed to cover, as assumed in 2003, such countries as Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine. A year later it included some countries of the South Caucasus: Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Russia eventually rejected the offer of being a part of the joint Neighbourhood Policy. It was not the first time that EU officials were confronted with such behaviour of the Kremlin, indicating that relations between the EU and Russia cannot be regarded as an element of a wider policy for a group of states. As there was no position prepared exclusively for Russia within the Neighbourhood Policy, its participation was not possible.

To sum up, the biggest advantage of the European Neighbourhood Policy was the fact that it emerged as a joint initiative of the EU. Its greatest weaknesses include casting all European states declaring a willingness to join the EU in one bag with the states that either never intended to do so, are placed outside of Europe, or have different problems. The best measure of

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their scale is the fact that at the time of their joining the initiative of the EU Neighbourhood Policy, countries such as Egypt or Tunisia were relatively stable dictatorships. Nonetheless, it also needs to be said that already at the very dawn of the Neighbourhood Policy, the objectives related to the EU policy towards the Southern and Eastern Neighbours were kept separate, which matched the Polish expectations. It was clearly, even though in a quite vague and formal way outlined in a strategic document issued in May 2004. Regarding the Eastern Neighbours, four priorities were mentioned. The first priority was economic cooperation in a rather wide context of integration in the area of economy, business projects, social policy, as well as trade and infrastructure. The second priority concerned environmental protection. The third related to the issues of justice and internal affairs which were crucial for implementing any reforms in Ukraine. The fourth priority was of a rather general and enigmatic nature and it concerned ‘relations between communities’\(^\text{16}\). Poland’s influence on the establishment of the Neighbourhood Policy was not sufficient enough as to adjust it to Polish ambitions at that time.

Thus, it comes hardly as a surprise that practically from the very beginning of the establishment of the Neighbourhood Policy, debates were initiated on the ways to extract Eastern states from the common set of EU neighbours. From the very beginning the shape of the Neighbourhood Policy agreed on in 2004 was not satisfying. Meanwhile, Poland gained the opportunity to influence the shape of the EU Eastern policy from within of the organisation. In all EU institutions the presence of Polish officials increased significantly after 2004. Even though the official adaptation process to new working conditions usually lasts long, politicians adapted faster in these new conditions. The European Parliament played a role here as in 2004 some politicians including Bronisław Geremek, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Konrad Szymański, Janusz Onyszczewicz, and several other MPs who joined the parliament, were well prepared to put political pressure and influence the parliamentary rhetoric. After 2004, but before the creation of the Eastern Partnership program, the main issue was to permanently stress the need to develop the ENP in the Eastern context, as well as establish a separate direction of EU policy which would focus on the East. The line of the Polish policy was well illustrated in a speech by Danuta Hübner, the first Polish Commissioner, addressed to the influential

Bilderberg Group. Hübner shared her views already as a commissioner designated by the Polish government, which took place before the outbreak of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, that is at the time when relatively negative opinions about Leonid Kuchma’s rule were dominant in Western circles. This explains why at that time encouraging the European Union to open up to the East might have caused some confusion. Hübner said: ‘I believe that the accession of the new members will lead to deepening our relations with Eastern Europe, the countries of the Southern part of the Mediterranean and with the Middle East within the European Neighbourhood Policy. The Polish government will definitely strive to strengthen its ties with the East as, at the end of the day, for Poland this is a very special neighbourhood. I think that the next new EU member states will share this opinion. Enlargement also increased the number of member states that are clearly in favour of admitting Turkey in the EU, something that can already be observed in the European Parliament’17. Hübner’s theses were straightforward when compared with standard commissioners’ speeches. Her wide vision of the future EU is clear with a definite enlargement paradigm. There is no doubt that the support for Turkey’s admission, uttered by the Polish politician, meant having a say in the wider debate on whether or not the EU should enlarge at all in the future. Hübner was a Polish negotiator of the accession treaty and few people were more knowledgeable about the specifics of European policy than her. In autumn 2004 she was convinced that the direction of the Polish government’s policy should be a development of an EU Eastern policy with Poland’s participation and based on the Polish experience.

**THE QUESTION OF ‘OPEN DOORS’**

In her bold speech in front of the Bilderberg Group (also on the role of Poland in strengthening the Transatlantic ties) Danuta Hübner did not raise the issue of EU enlargement towards the East. There was no doubt, however, that it was the direction towards which her speech was heading. Meanwhile, the question of ‘membership perspective’, or as Aleksander Kwaśniewski put it, ‘open doors’, for other states became a political canon of Poland’s Eastern

policy within the EU between 2003 and 2004. ‘The German argument’ was
formally and more often informally brought up in this case. It indicated that
before 2004 Germany had been the main actor pushing EU enlargement
towards the East. One of its arguments was a pragmatic conviction that it is
necessary to build a zone of ‘stability and prosperity’ in this region. There
are, however, several problems related to the debate on the ‘membership
perspective’. Undertaken at the political level with understandable intentions,
from the point of view of Polish interests, it somehow questions the legal
substance of the problem which is quite clear as upon having met certain
required criteria, countries that are situated in Europe are, in accordance
with European law, guaranteed by EU member states the right to apply for
membership. This means, that the ‘perspective’ exists in the legal sense and
it should not be questioned. The debate on the future enlargement which has
been taking place with Poland’s participation since the great enlargement of
2004 is one of the key factors contributing to EU internal diversity, which,
tactically speaking, might obstruct dialogue with other member states
reluctant to enlargement. On the other hand, however, from the Polish point
of view, it is difficult to stay away from this issue as it was introduced into
the political discourse by some European leaders. This issue also has some
practical implications. As Agnieszka K. Cianciara rightly states, a discussion
of further enlargement of the EU towards the East might lead to ‘a vicious
circle effect’ as some states claim that a political promise of enlargement
is necessary for speeding up the reforms in Eastern countries while others
believe that it is actually the too slow speed of the reforms that is the obstacle
to gaining the ‘membership perspective’\textsuperscript{18}. If we agree that democratisation
in a wide context is a key element of EU policy towards the East, we then
have to admit that the former of the presented opinions is correct. We
cannot talk about electoral victories of political forces in such countries as
Ukraine or Moldova which are striving to speed up the reforms, if they are
unable to find a reliable promise of membership. Apart from the issue of
‘the membership perspective’ there is another crucial element of the Polish
position regarding potential EU enlargement towards the East, namely an
implicit, but well understood in political declarations, agreement to deepen
the integration process in exchange for a go-ahead for future enlargement
from the ‘old’ member states. Readiness to accept the enhanced role of
a joint foreign policy set in Brussels was clearly formulated during the earlier

Warszawa: Institute of Political Studies at the Polish Academy of Sciences, p. 158.
mentioned conference in February 2003. This approach might be interpreted as an attempt to overtake France’s and other member states’ positions. It was already during the period preceding the enlargement of 2004 that a problem had emerged regarding the price (a weaker community) the EU would have to pay for the enlargement. The fears that EU enlargement would ‘water down’ the EU were in the 1990s a permanent element of EU internal debate. In this context, it is worth quoting a report of the European Commission issued on June 24th 1992 on the rules for the next EU enlargements, plainly excluding the states of the former Soviet Union from this group. On the same note, there were debates initiated for instance by France on the institutional reform of the EU after entering into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam19.

**ROAD TOWARDS EASTERN PARTNERSHIP**

With hindsight, it is clear that the expectations related to Poland’s formulating the EU policy in the East after the enlargement of 2004, especially in regards to the European Neighbourhood Policy, were not fully met. At the same time, however, it is quite obvious that Polish optimistic determinism had an impact on the formulation of the EU’s Eastern policy in subsequent years to a greater extent than Poland’s power in the EU would indicate. It is also quite evident that Polish politicians and experts underestimated Russia’s influence on Western European political elites. On the other hand, it must be noted that initially the Polish position was, above all, characterised by articulating and understanding the conflict of interests with Russia and in the beginning a humble postulate was put forward to quiet down these conflicts20. At the same time, it seemed that the rhetoric undertaken towards Russia was one of the criteria of the Polish program of the EU Eastern policy and the following problem emerged: in order to get the attention in the West towards Eastern policy, the position towards Russia had to be slightly eased, which in turn frequently meant easing Polish judgment. The approach of an optimistic determinism in Eastern policy was dominant and it meant an unconditional

focus on further EU enlargement as well as a belief that Poland needs to play the role of an advocate of the Eastern neighbours that are on their way to the EU.

Poland’s position was structurally weakened by the fact that the member states from the Mediterranean region, which happen to be more important within the EU, were interested in promoting cooperation with their Mediterranean neighbours. It was assumed that if such countries as Libya or Tunisia are handed over some resources for their development more migrants will arrive in the south of Europe. During the first years following 2004 new Central European member states were clearly too weak to argue for their point of view.

From the perspective of the EU Neighbours, the greatest achievement of the European Neighbourhood Policy was the creation, from the moment of the new EU budget perspective entering into force in 2007, of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), a systemic improvement of mechanisms financing cooperation within the neighbourhood. The year 2007 opened, for different reasons, a new chapter in thinking about EU Eastern policy. In April 2007 the German presidency in the EU announced a plan called the Black Sea Synergy. In this way the German government took over the initiative of creating an Eastern branch of the EU external policy. Actions aiming at establishing a program for the Black Sea region naturally accelerated after the EU accession of Romania and Bulgaria in January of that year. Just as the 2004 enlargement was the driving force behind the ENP, the subsequent 2007 enlargement, even though smaller in size, accelerated the maturity process of the Black Sea Synergy.

The Synergy might be treated as a supplement to the ENP or as a test probing how effective it would be to concentrate on the expected development of the Eastern dimension of the EU policy around the Black Sea. In the creation of the Synergy we can also see an element of checking how advanced an offer can be made by the EU to Eastern partners while still


maintaining internal cohesion. That meant including the states of the Black Sea region: Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania, as well as the states which are culturally related to the Black Sea region: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece and Moldova. The very enlisting of potential Synergy member states reveals the first barrier in the efficient organisation of the Synergy, i.e. a difficulty in formulating its political objectives. Three out of these states were already EU member states, Turkey has been involved in the ‘everlasting’ accession process, the majority of potential member states were operating under the European Neighbourhood Policy, whereas Russia acted as an EU strategic partner, notably using the ENP funds, i.e. the established ENPI. The only thing that the potential members of the Black Sea Synergy shared in common was the geographical location around one sea. In fact, the establishment of the Black Sea Synergy proved that constant tensions created by several member states from the group of new members were efficient in a sense that Germany decided to put forward a new proposal. From the Polish perspective, the Synergy was a problematic idea since it pushed the issue of the EU’s Eastern policy away from the Polish border and naturally weakened Polish influence in this area. In Poland, German plans were received rather coldly and perhaps prompted a debate on seeking a formula for EU policy in the East. Warsaw found it difficult to accept that the Black Sea Synergy had an idealistic attitude towards Russia and assumed that Russia did not act as the EU political rival in Europe. This attitude disregarded the facts indicating that Russian policy was moving in the direction of neo-imperial illusions.

Almost at the same time as the Black Sea Synergy was coming into being, Polish President Lech Kaczyński put forward the initiative of an Energy Summit to be held in Kraków. While presenting his plan, Kaczyński was already aware how difficult it would be to get EU decision makers to back up far-reaching political promises for future EU enlargement, which was one of the reasons to narrow down his project to energy. Kaczyński’s plan was not formalised. Nonetheless, there was some tactics that were behind it: its potential support in European capitals (and it was clear that it would be difficult to obtain it) did not have to mean bringing matters to a head. The idea of an energy summit enforced some components of Poland’s position towards EU

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Eastern policy, especially its pragmatic economic element. It is worth recalling that Kaczyński’s plan corresponded with the earlier proposal formulated in January 2006 by the then Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz to launch an Energy Pact, known as the Musketeer Pact, with partners from the Visegrad Group countries that Marcinkiewicz was trying to mobilise. This plan was presented ad hoc and with no proper diplomatic groundwork. What is more, Marcinkiewicz was not involved enough in European affairs to be able to competently push the project forward. Furthermore, it was not clear whether the Southern neighbours and Poland were on the same page regarding threats related to Russia’s energy policy and the key issue was that a project of such significance and political potential directed against Russian policy could not be carried out in the EU only with the ‘new’ Central European partners. Nonetheless, Marcinkiewicz’s proposal added a significant element to Poland’s position within EU as it contributed to strengthening the practical dimension of criticism towards Russia’s policy. From that moment on it was probably seen as something more than just an idealistic call for a political perspective of enlargement for our neighbours. It is worth noting that at that time cooperation between German and Russian companies in the energy sector was thriving with the flagship project being the Nord Stream pipeline. From this perspective, the Polish proposal to focus on the energy sector must have caused some hesitation among EU Western partners as whether such an idea would not be regarded by Russia as a counter-argument for Gazprom interests, i.e. Russian goals in Europe. A year later President Kaczyński returned to the idea of shaping EU Eastern policy around the energy issue while hosting a meeting in Kraków. The political meaning of the Kraków initiative endorsed by Kaczyński stemmed from the idea that two EU member states, Poland and Lithuania, would initiate collaboration with neighbours outside the EU based entirely on specific projects. The first area of such cooperation was, as mentioned above, the energy sector. Thus, in May 2007 the presidents of Poland and Lithuania, as well as Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan, along with a special envoy of the president of Kazakhstan, came to Kraków. The main outcome of the Kraków summit, repeated in the autumn of 2007 in Vilnius following an official invitation by Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus, was the creation of Sarmatia, a company that would prepare an Odessa-Brody-Gdańsk transport channel. The political

24 In K. Marcinkiewicz’s initiative one can also see some reference to the energy proposals of the so-called Norwegian pipeline put forward at the end of J. Buzek’s government 2000–2001, later abandoned by L. Miller’s government.
demonstration, illustrating the capability of creating political structures between the EU and the East outside of the European Neighbourhood Policy, was critically important. The Black Sea Synergy, proposed by the Germans, lacked objectives, whereas the Kaczyński initiative had a clearly (perhaps too clearly) defined objective. Russian President Vladimir Putin demonstrated his position towards Kaczyński’s plan by convening an energy summit in Turkmenbashi at exactly the same time as the Kraków event was held. The Russian Kommersant noticed this fact while the Polish press repeated the commentary dominant in Moscow: ‘On the eve of Poland opening the “anti-Russian” energy summit dedicated to a search for alternative sources of oil and natural gas, Moscow, led by President Vladimir Putin, struck back’25. Taking all this into account, it is very clear that Kaczyński’s idea could not receive any serious support from either the EU or the United States.

EASTERN PARTNERSHIP 2008–2013

The year 2008 brought about a breakthrough in the debate on the EU Eastern policy in the form of an initiative of the Swedish and Polish Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Carl Bildt and Radosław Sikorski. It is worth noting that at the outset Sikorski tried to also involve in this project the German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier. Cornelius Ochmann, an influential German analyst, stresses that in 2008 the German Minister of Foreign Affairs was not prepared for a positive confrontation with the proposal brought to Berlin by the new Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, who, as a result, went to Stockholm instead26. A striking highlight of Sikorski’s project was that it included Bildt, a well-known and highly regarded European politician and a former Prime Minister of Sweden. Eastern issues within the EU were therefore going beyond the backyard of the former Warsaw Pact and Central European states, i.e. the ‘new’ EU member states. Failures of the previous Polish initiatives were caused by difficulties in gaining major partners from the old EU as allies. In the spring of 2008 this barrier was removed as


the position of the guarantor of the new project was taken up by Sweden, a country whose position in regards to the EU external policy was assumedly focused not on interests but human rights, the idea of supporting reforms in the East, etc. Moreover, it was also essential that the initiative of Sikorski and Bildt moved back the axis of cooperation between EU member states and their Eastern neighbours from the Black Sea towards the Baltic Sea. For the Eastern partners it was also crucial that after political changes in Moldova there were three clearly pro-European governments in the East of the EU: Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova.

The core of the Eastern Partnership lied in coalescing numerous activities. First of all, it contained potentially effective legal instruments: the association agreement and the free trade agreement. In both cases, when comparing it with the experience of Central European states from the previous decade, the initiative went much further. Secondly, visa arrangements constituted a vital element of functionality within the Partnership program, both with regards to ad hoc visa facilitation and long-term arrangements, i.e. visa waiver programs. Thirdly, the Eastern Partnership became a forum for political cooperation. The European Parliament established the EU and Eastern neighbours Parliamentary Assembly called the EuroNest. It was this parliamentary dimension that, even though it did not introduce many practical benefits for the Eastern partners, sent a powerful message in the political sense. It became an element linking the elite of the Eastern Partnership states with EU political elite. Fourthly, the Eastern Partnership program was also designed as an area for cooperation among NGOs and civil society. Last but not least, the Eastern Partnership was supposed to be an instrument of EU financial support for projects organised in Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the countries of the South Caucasus. The key elements of the partnership were the association agreements and the free trade agreements. Assumedly, proper legal mechanisms can be much more effective than grants financed from the EU budget. However, the question that comes to mind in this regard is whether they did not go too far. And whether attaching to them – in the situation when they enter into force – an obligation to carry out deep reforms was not a mistake in the sense that it went beyond the organisational and political capabilities of the governments in the East as well as the limits of social patience of their societies.

From the point of view of the Polish policy, the paradigm of optimistic determinism defined by Dębski, the proposals of the Eastern Partnership, even though they did not mention directly ‘the membership perspective’ nor could please the maximalists, were correct.
However, the EU member states in the Mediterranean region were not wasting their time either. Taking advantage of the fact that France was leading the EU Presidency, Nicolas Sarkozy convened in July 2008 a political summit to which he invited the leaders of the Mediterranean region. As a result, the Union for the Mediterranean was created. In terms of the organisation it was better equipped than the Eastern Partnership program which at that time was still undergoing its final phases of preparation. However, neither the Union nor the Eastern Partnership went beyond the general framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which is best evidenced by the fact that the creation of the new initiatives was not followed up adequately with large additional sums of money from the EU budget. Another signal that the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, despite significant corrections, was in force was a refusal to declare the membership perspective for the Eastern Partnership states. Nonetheless, it was only since the launch of the Eastern Partnership program in 2008 that the policies towards the Eastern and Southern neighbours started to be perceived in the EU as separate and Poland was one of the driving forces in this process. This allowed for the consolidation of Eastern initiatives within one package, i.e. the Eastern Partnership program. The earlier East-oriented initiatives, including the ideas of the Energy pact, the Kraków (energy) initiative, or the Black Sea Synergy, gave way to the Eastern Partnership program which, nonetheless, was built on the experience of the previous projects or the past attempts to implement them.

The development of the Eastern Partnership was accompanied by some dramatic events in the East. In August 2008 Russia attacked Georgia, which presumably hastened the maturity process of the Eastern Partnership program. On 3 December 2008 the European Commission approved the plan of the Eastern Partnership program. Its main elements included a free trade zone, association agreements, visa facilitation, and 600 million euro allocated for joint projects. During the Czech presidency in 2009 the Eastern Partnership program was officially inaugurated at a summit in Prague. It needs to be emphasised that the doors to Europe were opened for the citizens of the Eastern European states in the form of visa facilitation and with a perspective of visa waiver, a liberal approach to carrying out investment, convergence of regulations and standards with the EU, and cooperation on common border control, energy and economic security. Subsequent Eastern Partnership summits took place on 29 and 30 September 2011 in Warsaw (during the Polish Presidency) and on 28 November 2013 in Vilnius. The Warsaw summit failed to show any significant progress in the development of the
partnership program, while the Vilnius summit proved to be the key in terms of the future of its direction. During the meeting in Lithuania, Georgia and Moldova initialled the association agreements with the EU and an earlier visa facilitation program was introduced for Azerbaijan. Those events influenced the presentation of the Vilnius summit achievements in a fairly positive light at first. The truth was different, however, as the key element of the Vilnius meeting was supposed to be the signing of the association agreement with Ukraine. This is the issue around which the fiercest battle was fought.

European institutions were defending detained Yulia Tymoshenko and attempted to make the signing or implementation of the association agreement between the EU and Ukraine dependant on the release of Ukraine’s former Prime Minister. At the same time during the negotiation process with the European Commission, the Ukrainian negotiators were faced with a constant refusal when requesting guarantees for Ukraine’s perspective membership in the EU. Viktor Yanukovych appeared to be drawing close to signing the agreement, however, he failed to release Tymoshenko. Finally, literally in the last weeks preceding the Vilnius summit, some elements of the bluff in both strategies leaked out as the EU indeed repealed the condition of Tymoshenko’s release. When pressed hard by Russia, Yanukovych, despite the EU’s readiness to sign the association agreement with Ukraine, avoided signing the document. This issue was the spark that ignited the fire of discontent of Ukrainians who had been ensured by Yanukovych’s administration that he intended to sign the agreement. This resulted in protests which broke out at the Independence Square (the Maidan) in Kyiv and lasted several months. Their political value and symbolism clearly related to Ukraine’s integration with the EU. The EuroMaidan and its consequences (the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine) ended an era in the development of the Eastern Partnership program. The EU’s biggest mistake was once again a poor assessment of Russia’s intentions. The EU treated Russia as a partner, a difficult one, but still a partner. Conversely, Russia treated the EU, especially after the West supported the Rose Revolution (Georgia) and the Orange Revolution (Ukraine), as a rival. While the EU would offer Russia joint programs, such as the Partnership for Modernisation (2010), Russia would accept neither the EU as a whole nor its individual member states as partners for carrying out internal reforms in Russia.

In summary, the main benefit of the Eastern Partnership program were its legal instruments for cooperation with the EU. The EU association agreements and supporting documents concluded by Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine mean that a certain chapter in the history of the Eastern Partnership was coming to an end. Secondly, visa facilitation followed by opening the doors to the West for many citizens of the Eastern Partnership states were vital achievements as well. Last but not least, the very fact that the Eastern Partnership program was created as a common EU policy directed at the East carved out of the European Neighbourhood Policy shall be also deemed as positive.

The major disadvantage of the Eastern Partnership program was that it promised more than it could deliver; a good example here is the energy sector. In fact, energy is the key issue in relations with EU partners in the East. The second problem with this program was that, similarly to the ENP, it lumped together states of a different status in terms of their own EU integration plans. This meant putting together countries that were striving for membership with countries that were interested exclusively in economic cooperation, which was weakening the program’s cohesion. The third problem was that the EU partners from the Caucasus moved their conflicts onto the Eastern Partnership forum, which also brought about some negative effects as, for example, a paralysis of the EuroNest operation. The fourth issue to be mentioned here is the status of Belarus that was never clearly defined. At one time cooperation took place only with Belarusian NGOs or representatives of independent political groups. At other times the EU would allow cooperation with the government in Minsk. The fifth issue is Ukraine. The scale of this country’s problems, due to its economic and political significance, cannot be compared with the EU integration problems of countries such as Moldova or Georgia.

From the point of view of Polish interests in regard to the development of the Eastern Partnership, it is worth stressing that there are three systematic errors in the program’s construction. First of all, the role of Russia, that has used the Eastern Partnership program for its political blackmail, has not been correctly defined. Russia declared itself a victim of the EU and the creation of the Eastern Partnership was presented by the Kremlin as a way for the EU (West) to ‘encircle’ Russia. Russia simultaneously undertook activities against the program’s objectives. Poland, just as much as it has managed to force through the inclusive, optimistic and deterministic thinking into the EU, has failed to transfer to the European forum an important assumption of the

Polish Eastern policy that originates from the Giedroyc doctrine and that is based on the assumption that the territory of Ukraine, Belarus and also other post-Soviet states constitute a field for rivalry with Russia – how this rivalry is expressed is another issue. Secondly, it was also a mistake not to declare that the Eastern Partnership states might end up with full EU membership. On the one hand, there were strong expectations from our partners to carry out deep and complex social reforms, while, on the other hand, the EU communication on the political level was not clear. Thirdly, there were not enough financial resources for such a large area that make up the six Eastern Partnership states and, additionally, the funds were dispersed over too many minor projects. Instead, they should have been concentrated on, for example, the project of the creation of the Eastern Partnership University. From the Polish perspective, the maximum accumulation of financial resources would have been the most effective, alas it was lacking.

REFERENCES


KEY COMPONENTS OF THE POLISH POSITION IN REGARD TO THE EASTERN POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Summary

As early as in the period before the enlargement of the European Union in 2004, Poland – as a candidate state at the time – took part in the debate before the European Neighbourhood Policy (formally introduced just a few days after the 2004 enlargement) was conceived. During the debate, the key issue was the idea of further enlargement of the EU after adequate requirements are met. One of the most important elements of the Polish programme within the EU Eastern policy in the period 2006–2014 was energy and activities within the Eastern Partnership. After Sweden supported the Eastern Partnership at its initial stage, Poland gained a lot of positive experience. A supposed permanent element of the Polish strategy within the EU Eastern policy was also its consent for the strengthening of common EU institutions, especially in the internal policy, which might have been interpreted as promoting the principle of ‘more enlargement for deepening’ for the co-operation within the EU. It can be perceived as an element of transaction with the member states that were against or sceptical about enlargement and/or an attempt to strengthen Polish stand within the EU Eastern policy with the use of common institutions. A specific canon of the Polish stand within the EU Eastern policy related to the Polish political thought tradition which has developed over the last 15 years. From the point of view of the catalogue of Polish targets, one can notice a tendency in the EU to accept some Polish arguments as common ones – it is seen when the development of the idea and implementation of the ENP is compared with what resulted from the Eastern Partnership.

KLUCZOWE ELEMENTY STANOWISKA POLSKI WOBEC POLITYKI WSCHODNIEJ UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ

Streszczenie

Już w okresie przed rozszerzeniem UE w 2004 roku Polska, jeszcze z pozycji kraju kandydującego, uczestniczyła w debacie przed powstaniem Europejskiej Polityki Sąsiedztwa, która została formalnie zainicjowana zaledwie kilka
dni po rozszerzeniu 2004 roku. Podczas tej debaty na czoło wysunęła się zasada dalszego rozszerzania UE po spełnieniu odpowiednich warunków. Jednym z najważniejszych elementów w polskim programie dla polityki wschodniej UE stała się w latach 2006–2014 energetyka oraz działanie w ramach Partnerstwa Wschodniego. Polska zebrala pozytywne doświadczenia po tym, jak już w inicjalnej fazie projektowi PW udzieliła wsparcia Szwecji. Domyślnym stałym elementem polskiej strategii w polityce wschodniej Unii była też zgoda na wzmocnienie wspólnych instytucji unijnych – szczególnie w polityce zewnętrznej, co mogło być interpretowane jako promowanie w praktyce zasady „więcej rozszerzenia za pogłębienie” współpracy w ramach UE. Można to widzieć jako element transakcji z przeciwnymi lub sceptycznymi wobec rozszerzenia państwami członkowskimi lub/i jako próbę wzmocnienia polskiego stanowiska w polityce wschodniej Unii za pomocą wspólnych instytucji. W ostatnich 15 latach wykształcił się swego rodzaju kanon polskiego stanowiska w polityce wschodniej UE związany z tradycją polskiej myśli politycznej. Patrząc z punktu widzenia katalogu polskich celów, zauważalna jest w Unii tendencja do akceptowania jako wspólnych niektórych polskich argumentów – widać to przy porównaniu, jak kształtowała się idea i realizacji EPS, a jak przebiegało to w wyniku Partnerstwa Wschodniego.

КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ ЭЛЕМЕНТЫ ПОЗИЦИИ ПОЛЬШИ В ОТНОШЕНИИ ВОСТОЧНОЙ ПОЛИТИКИ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СОЮЗА

Резюме

В период, предшествующий расширению ЕС в 2004 году, Польша, ещё с позиции страны-кандидата, принимала участие в дебатах перед созданием Европейской политики соседства, которая формально была инициирована через несколько дней после расширения 2004 года. В ходе этих дебатов во главе угла был поставлен принцип дальнейшего расширения ЕС при выполнении соответствующих условий. Одним из важнейших элементов польской программы для восточной политики ЕС в 2006–2014 годах была энергетика, а также деятельность в рамках Восточного партнёрства. Польша приобрела положительный опыт после того, как уже на начальном этапе проект Восточного партнёрства поддержала Швецию. Подразумеваемым постоянным элементом польской стратегии в восточной политике ЕС было также согласие на укрепление общин институтов ЕС – в особенности во внешней политике, что
может толковаться как продвижение в практику принципа «больше расширения для углубления» сотрудничества в рамках ЕС. Можно в этом наблюдать наличие элемента сделки с выступающими против расширения за счет государств-членов либо скептически настроенными по отношению к нему, либо/и попытку укрепления позиции Польши в восточной политике ЕС при помощи общих институтов. В последние 15 лет сформировался своеобразный канон позиции Польши в восточной политике ЕС, связанный с традицией польской политической идеи. Рассматривая с точки зрения директории польских целей, можно заметить в политике ЕС тенденцию к принятию в качестве общих некоторых польских аргументов – это можно увидеть благодаря сравнению того, как формировалась идея и реализация Европейской политики соседства, и того, как это проходило в результате Восточного партнёрства.